The Centre for the Study of Social Action (CSSA) Seminars will host a talk by Gregory Wheeler (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management) on

*Mispriced gambles: What peers learn when they disagree*

(Abstract below)

All welcome!

DATE: Tuesday 9th May at 2:30 PM

PLACE: Aula Paci, Department of Philosophy, University of Milan, (via Festa del Perdono 7, 20122, Milano)

For more information, please visit our website: http://www.cssa.unimi.it/

ABSTRACT:

One criticism to the theory of imprecise probabilities (IP) is that there is no compelling example which mandates choosing an imprecise probability model over a precise probability one, but instead the appeal of the theory rests on intuitions about "Knighten" uncertainty that are inconclusive. This talk answers this criticism with a problem from the peer disagreement literature. The Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence (PIE) Principle maintains that a resolution strategy to peer disagreements should be able to preserve unanimous judgments of evidential irrelevance among the peers. It is well-known that no standard Bayesian resolution strategy satisfies the PIE Principle, and some -- such as Carl Wagner -- have argued so much the worse for PIE. In this paper we respond by giving a loss aversion argument in support of PIE and against Bayes. The upshot is that, given the choice between IP and Bayes, if you want PIE, you must renounce Bayes and choose IP.

-- Hykel Hosni

Associate Professor of Logic, Department of Philosophy University of Milan http://www.filosofia.unimi.it/~hosni/

Editor of The Reasoner http://thereasoner.org/

Secretary of the Italian Association for Logic and Applications http://www.ailalogica.it